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Attributing responsibility in devolved contexts. 
Experimental evidence from the UK 
 
Sandra León (University of York) and Lluís Orriols (Universidad Carlos III) 
ABSTRACT. In devolved contexts, people may get it wrong in their responsibility 
assignments because they are unsure about who does what or because they filter their 
attributions of credit and blame through their political lenses. This paper theorises about these 
two mechanisms and tests the role of cognitive bias in moderating responsibility judgements 
in multilevel systems. Using a survey experiment on responsibility attribution for the NHS 
outcomes in Scotland and Wales, results show that partisanship is the strongest bias of 
responsibility assignments between regional and central authorities. Yet national identity also 
operates as cognitive bias, a role that so far has been theoretically and empirically overlooked 
in the literature. The empirical findings point to the role of partisanship and identity as 
cognitive guides to make responsibility judgements in complex institutional setting, such as 

























The control of governments in representative democracies crucially depends on the role of 
elections as an effective mechanism to punish or reward politicians for policy outcomes. 
Incumbents abide by the preferences of voters because they anticipate the electoral costs 
associated to them departing from the electorate’s preferences. Yet elections can only serve 
to hold governments to account if the electorate can effectively discern to what extent 
politicians act in voters’ interests (Przeworski et al., 1999). Thus, a necessary condition for 
accountability is that citizens can accurately identify who is responsible for what. If 
otherwise responsibility attribution is blurred and incumbents end up being rewarded or 
punished by the electorate in a way that is unrelated to policy outcomes, the incentives of 
politicians to be responsive to the electorate’s preferences may ultimately fade away 
(Cheibub and Przeworski, 1999). 
If responsibility attribution is an essential mechanism to make accountability work, then what 
are the conditions that undermine it? People may get it wrong when assigning responsibility 
for different reasons. First, they might not be sure about who is responsible for what due to 
powers being highly fragmented between different actors. This is the clarity of responsibility 
argument developed by the literature that studies the impact of institutional conditions upon 
attribution of responsibility and accountability. Devolution is one of the institutional 
characteristics that may weaken clarity of responsibility and, although it has recently captured 
the attention of comparative research, the specific mechanisms whereby the vertical 
fragmentation of powers affects responsibility judgements remain unclear. Does devolution 
simply confuse voters about who is responsible for what?  Or does it make individuals more 






















The last question is related to the second mechanism whereby people may not accurately 
assign responsibility, namely the fact that they are not neutral when they think and talk about 
politics. According to the literature on social psychology, responsibility judgements are 
biased by individuals’ prior political beliefs, which act as perceptual screens or lenses 
through which responsibility attribution is filtered. Social psychologists have labelled this as 
“group-serving” bias, which refers to individuals assigning responsibility in a selective 
manner: claiming credit for successes for the group they identify with and blaming out-
groups for failures (Taylor and Doria, 1981). The literature has made a convincing case that 
politically-relevant group identities such as partisanship operate as a cognitive bias in 
responsibility attribution. However, there are some questions that still call for further 
analysis, namely the study of national identity as a potential in-group bias, which has been so 
far overlooked in the politics literature
1
; and theoretical framework on devolved contexts.   
This paper explores how cognitive mechanisms affect responsibility attribution in devolved 
contexts. We argue that the vertical fragmentation of powers in decentralized systems poses 
two constraints on individuals, namely an informational challenge and an opportunity 
structure. The informational challenge means that individuals will struggle to know who 
does what as powers are vertically fragmented between different levels of government. The 
opportunity structure refers to multi-tiered governance structures opening an opportunity for 
individuals to engage in a blame-attribution game between levels of government. We expect 
individuals to react to these constraints by using informational shortcuts and in-group 
favouritism in their assignments of credit and blame between the central and subnational 
governments. The fundamental hypotheses in the paper are that individuals will resort to 
partisan affiliation as well as to national identity as their cognitive guides to make 
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 In the social psychology literature there is research in ethnocentric attribution of responsibility using the case 






















responsibility judgements between levels of government. Our hypotheses are tested with a 
survey experiment on responsibility attribution for the National Health Service in two 
devolved nations: Scotland and Wales. Empirical findings show that partisanship has a more 
prominent and encompassing effect on responsibility attribution than national identity; that 
group loyalties have a stronger moderating role in Scotland than in Wales; and that the 
strongest impact is found among individuals who are exposed to the negative treatment, not 
to the positive one.  
This paper advances research in the area in three ways. First,  the analysis offers new 
theoretical and empirical insights into the role of national identity on responsibility 
attribution, a relationship that so far has been overlooked in the literature. The findings of the 
paper suggest that national identity should be considered in future studies that test for in-
group bias in responsibility assignments. 
Second, the empirical findings of the paper are of relevance to inform the current debate on 
British devolution and, more generally, the democratic implications of the increasing 
migration of powers from national authorities due to ongoing decentralization (Tatham and 
Mbaye, 2017). Constitutional amendments since the late 1990s have turned the UK into one 
of the most heterogeneous institutional settings amongst European countries and this is the 
first paper to analyse with experimental data responsibility attribution between regional and 
central authorities in the UK. The ongoing nature of the process of devolution in the UK, 
illustrated by recent reforms in Wales and Scotland as well as by the process of English 
devolution to local combined authorities, will result in further institutional complexity. This 
context may certainly complicate responsibility assignments and poses the question on how 
British citizens will cope with that complexity. The evidence developed in this paper points 
to the role of partisan alignments and national identity as cognitive guides for individuals in 






















Finally, previous versions of the theoretical arguments developed in this paper have informed 
other research on responsibility attribution (see León and Jurado 2018, Authors 2018). By 
providing a theoretical account on how the specific constraints posed by decentralization may 
affect the use of partisanship and national identity, these works are contributing to a research 
agenda that aims at providing a better understanding of the role of institutions in activating 
individuals’ cognitive biases.  
 
Responsibility attribution in devolved contexts 
Although the normative theories on decentralisation envisioned a clear separation of powers 
between different levels of government, the actual distribution of powers in decentralised 
systems is characterised by shared authority, meaning that legislative and executive 
responsibilities over policy areas are usually allocated to different levels of government 
(Rodden, 2006). As stated above, to be able to sanction governments effectively individuals 
must be able to assign responsibilities between different levels of government. Yet in federal 
systems voters may struggle to distinguish which political authority is responsible for the 
state of the economy or the provision of public services and goods. As a result, the 
connection between policy outcomes and the responsible political authority that lies at the 
core of the reward-punishment model of retrospective voting may weaken, hampering the 
capacity of citizens to hold governments to account
2
.  
                                                          
2
 See Anderson (2000), Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998), Powell and Whitten (1993), Royed, Leyden and Borrelli 
(2000), Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci (2013), Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka (2002). More recent contributions 
have extended the analysis beyond the economy by exploring the impact of clarity of responsibility in areas 























The literature on clarity of responsibility has theorised the idea of blurred responsibility 
attribution and empirically tested whether it undermines electoral accountability. 
Contributions in this area have analysed whether certain institutional conditions that involve 
a high fragmentation of powers between different political actors, such as coalition 
governments, bicameralism or federalism, are associated to weaker economic voting. 
Following upon the seminal work of Powell and Whitten (1993), several works have 
classified institutions according to a “clarity of responsibility” index and showed that, in 
countries where this index is low, economic voting is less prevalent
3
.  
Notwithstanding the significant contributions of this literature to a better understanding of the 
relationship between the institutional set-up and electoral accountability, this approach is of 
limited value to provide a nuanced account of responsibility judgements in devolved 
contexts. For one, with the exception of Anderson’s work (2009, 2006), in this literature the 
role of decentralised institutions is only superficially addressed, as federalism is considered 
as part of the institutional characteristics that are used to calculate each country’s “clarity of 
responsibility” index. For two, the theory assumes that attribution is the key moderator 
between policy outcomes and vote, but the exact mechanisms whereby low clarity institutions 
affect individuals’ responsibility assignments remain much of a black box. Besides, the 
empirical analyses cannot inform these theoretical gaps because individuals’ responsibility  
judgements are not actually tested, but inferred from the relationship between country-level 
institutional conditions and the strength of economic voting
4
.  
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 Anderson (2000), Lowry, Alt and Ferree (1998), Royed, Leyden and Borrelli (2000), Hobolt, Tilley and 
Banducci (2013), Nadeau, Niemi and Yoshinaka (2002) 
4
 The problem with aggregated-level studies is that they “make assertions about how institutional context shapes 
individuals’ attributions of responsibility, (but) none of the studies (…) actually incorporate these attributions 























How do citizens then cope with the vertical distribution of powers when it comes to assigning 
responsibility? Several studies have explored responsibility attribution in federal states, but 
the empirical evidence they provide is not conclusive, pointing to opposite directions. Some 
works show evidence that people struggle to allocate responsibilities between federal and 
regional authorities (Cutler, 2004, Cutler, 2008), particularly where federal arrangements 
have followed a more intertwined design (León, 2011, León and Orriols, 2016, Lago Peñas 
and Lago Peñas, 2011); whereas other studies have found that people can assign 
responsibilities between levels of government relatively accurately (Johns, 2011, Rudolph, 
2003a, Rudolph, 2003b). These works mostly focus on attribution accuracy, that is, 
individuals’ ability to discern the functional responsibilities that fall under the sphere of 
competences of federal, regional and local governments. Although they provide evidence on 
the extent to which people can get it right when identifying who is responsible for what, they 
fail to develop theoretically the individual mechanisms that may account for failed 
attribution. Do individual assignments simply become more random (less informed by 
knowledge)? What sort of strategies do individuals develop to cope with the informational 
challenge posed by the vertical fragmentation of powers? These are questions that require 
further theoretical development should we aim to have a better understanding on how 
individuals attribute responsibility when the vertical fragmentation of powers turns 
attribution into a daunting task. 
This paper purports to fill that theoretical gap by exploring the role of two separate cognitive 
mechanisms in responsibility attribution, namely group-serving bias and informational 
shortcuts (heuristics/cues). The former concept has been developed by the social psychology 
literature and refers to individuals’ tendency to claim credit for successes for the group to 
which they belong and blame out-group members for failures (Taylor and Jaggi, 1974, Taylor 






















individuals’ strategies to take competent decisions in spite of their lack of political 
knowledge ((Lupia, 1994, Sniderman et al., 1993, Popkin, 1994). This literature has 
particularly focused on the role of party identification as a heuristic that guides individuals’ 
political decisions (Downs, 1957, Druckman, 2001, Brader et al., 2013, Slothuus and de 
Vreese, 2010).   
Our argument is that in devolved contexts individuals will resort to in-group bias and 
informational shortcuts to assign responsibilities between levels of government  We argue 
that the vertical fragmentation of powers poses what we call an informational challenge and 
an opportunity structure, both of which activate the use of cognitive mechanisms in the 
assignment of responsibility (see also León, Jurado and Garmendia 2018)
5
. On the one hand, 
decentralised governance involves an informational challenge because the vertical 
distribution of powers complicates attribution. In this context we expect individuals to use 
cognitive shortcuts (heuristics), such as partisanship, to assign responsibilities for economic 
or social conditions in an efficient way. For instance, if an individual is unsure about who is 
responsible for economic conditions, she may rely on a simple shortcut such as what her 
preferred party says. Political parties do frequently engage in credit-taking and –especially- 
blame avoidance strategies on policy outcomes (Weaver 1986, Maravall 1999), so our 
argument is that party discourse on responsibility attribution may be used by individuals as a 
guide for their responsibility judgements
6
. The more difficult it is for voters to ascertain who 
is responsible for what, the more likely it is they will use party affiliation or identity to 
attribute credit and blame for policy outcomes.  
                                                          
5
 Previous versions of this argument have also informed the theoretical framework developed by León, Jurado 
and Garmendia (2018).   
6
 There is evidence on the use of “pass the buck” strategies by politicians in order to avoid blame for poor 























On the other hand, decentralised governance creates an opportunity for individuals to engage 
in a blame-attribution game because it increases the number of relevant political actors whom 
to assign reward and punishment for policy outcomes. The vertical fragmentation of powers 
gives individuals further opportunities to exonerate or credit their preferred incumbent party 
as there is a higher supply of political actors to which blame and credit can be attributed. Put 
it differently, devolution paves the way for “in-group” bias because favouring ones’ group 
may become easier when there are more potential relevant “out-groups” to which failure can 
be attributed. Following this argument, León, Jurado and Garmendia (2018) showed evidence 
of a more prominent role of partisan id on responsibility attribution in federal than in non -
federal European countries. In this paper we advance their work by testing the argument 
using experimental evidence and bringing the comparison at the regional level. 
Finally, so far the literature has mainly focused on individuals’ attachment to ruling political 
parties and showed that partisanship may act as a “perceptual screen”, meaning that voters 
are more likely to blame a level of government that is not ruled by their preferred political 




Yet there is a limited understanding in the literature of 
the role of other cognitive bias other than partisanship.  
In this paper we purport to fill this gap by exploring the group-serving bias role of national 
identity. The fact that national identity has been barely explored in the literature
8
 as a 
cognitive bias contrasts with the accumulated evidence showing that it is one of the most 
                                                          
7
 Hobolt and Tilley (2014), Malhotra and Kuo (2008), Gomez and Wilson (2001), Tilley and Hobolt (2011a), 
Rudolph (2003a), Rudolph (2003b), Peffley (1984), Peffley and Williams (1985), Tyler (1982). Other scholars 
show that partisan alignment tend to moderate the impact of economic evaluations in vote choices Rudolph 
(2003a), Rudolph (2003b), Marsh and Tilley (2009). 
8






















important group identities in shaping individuals’ political preferences
9
. Our argument is that 
people’s predispositions towards a particular territory (the “state” vs the “region”) may act as 
an in-group bias in shaping individuals’ judgements of responsibility between different levels 
of government. If the relative attachment towards the “state” or the “region” serves as a 
group of identification, then we can expect national identity to affect responsibility 
judgements in a similar way than partisanship: individuals will blame levels of government 
other than the one they identify with when poor policy outcomes are at stake and credit them 
for positive policy outcomes.  
 
Hypotheses 
We specify below two sets of testable hypotheses. First, we argue that, when confronted with 
positive or negative changes in a policy area, individuals will change responsibility 
attribution dependent on their partisanship. Specifically:  
 
H1a. Partisans of the regional incumbent party will attribute more responsibility to the 
central government when confronted with negative policy outcomes compared to 
positive ones. 
H1b Partisans of the central incumbent party will attribute less responsibility to the 
central government when confronted with negative policy outcomes compared to 
positive ones.  
                                                          
9
 Previous research has shown that people’s attitudes towards the centre-periphery cleavage are highly 
correlated with identity, so those who exhibit stronger regional identities are more likely to support further 
devolution to the regional level than those who support a stronger role for the central government Guibernau 






















Second, we state that, when faced with evidence that a certain policy is going well or badly, 
people will change responsibility attribution dependent on their national identity. 
Specifically: 
H2a. Individuals more identified with the “region” will attribute more responsibility 
to the central government when confronted with negative policy outcomes compared 
to positive ones. 
H2b. Individuals more identified with the “state” will attribute less responsibility to 
the central government when confronted with negative policy outcomes compared to 
positive ones. 
We expect both national identity and partisanship to have an influence on how individuals 
attribute responsibility between different levels of government. However, we do not have any 
theoretical expectation on whether national identity will have a stronger or weaker effect in 
responsibility judgements than partisanship. The analysis in the next sections will provide 
some empirical insights into the relative moderating role of each in-group bias.  
In our theoretical setting we stated that devolution activates the use of cognitive biases in 
responsibility attribution through two mechanisms: an informational challenge (low clarity of 
responsibility) and an opportunity structure (the existence of “out-group” political actors, 
namely different levels of government). In the English centralised scenario we expect none of 
these mechanisms to operate. On the one hand, clarity of responsibility is higher, so 
individuals are expected to resort less frequently to informational shortcuts to assign 
responsibility for policy outcomes. On the other hand, the prominent role of the central 
government in health care provision as well as the lack of specific partisan links with NHS 
regional authorities (as NHS is run by a non-departmental executive body) turns blame on 






















party. As a result, if our hypotheses are correct, we should expect no role of partisanship or 
national identity in moderating responsibility attribution in England. 
H3. Giving people information on negative or positive outcomes will have no effect 
on responsibility attributions in a centralised context (England)  
The experimental design 
To test the hypotheses set above we use a survey experiment
10
 on responsibility attribution
11
 
for health care outcomes in Scotland and Wales. We focus on responsibility attribution for 
health care outcomes between regional and central authorities because competences over the 
National Health Service (NHS) were devolved to those nations in 1999. We also use the 
survey experiment in England as a robustness test of the results found in Scotland and Wales. 
If our hypothesis is correct and cognitive biases operate through the informational challenge 
and an opportunity structure posed by devolution, then we expect partisanship and national 
identity to have no role in the centralised scenario of England.  
The experiment was conducted in the run-up to the general election in May 2015 (between 
30
th
 April and May 6) using samples of 700 individuals for each treatment that are 
representative of the population over the age of 18 in Scotland and Wales
12
. The experiment 
                                                          
10
 The experimental design is an excellent methodology to test for causal relationships. Survey experiments 
allow us to control the stimuli that individuals are exposed to and measure how they react to them. As we 
randomly assign the information to survey participants, that enables us to establish clear causal predictions. 
11
 Other works have also used survey experiments to explore the role of partisanship in individuals’ 
responsibility assignments, see Rudolph (2005), Malhotra and Kuo (2008), Tilley and Hobolt (2011b), Rico and 
Liñeira (2017). 
12
 The online survey used in this paper has 2108 observations: 702 for England, 698 for Scotland and 708 for 
Wales. The sample in each nation was recruited by Research Now, a well-established internet survey company 
that has online panels across 38 countries. The sample in each nation is representative of the nation population 
by sex and age. Respondents to our surveys were selected randomly from an online research panel of over 






















treatment consists of different statements about changes in health care attributed to experts 
(positive or negative), followed by a question on who is the main responsible for the NHS, 
with respondents asked to locate the degree of responsibility on a 7-point scale, where 1 
means that regional authorities have full responsibility and 7 means that UK central 
government has full responsibility
13
. This scale represents the dependent variable in the study 
and the exact wordings of the questions are: 
 
Negative treatment: Many experts say that healthcare in [Scotland/Wales] has 
generally worsened over the last year; for example, waiting times for patients in 
urgent services are now longer and time allocated to patients in primary care has 
decreased.  
Positive treatment: Many experts say that healthcare in [Scotland/Wales] has 
generally improved over the last year; for example, waiting times for patients in 
urgent services are now shorter and time allocated to patients in primary care has 
increased. 
All respondents: Which political authorities would you say are mainly responsible for 
the results of the NHS in [Scotland/Wales]? Please use a scale from 1 to 7, where '1' 
means that regional authorities have full responsibility and '7' means that UK central 
government has “full responsibility”. 
The experiment was separately conducted in each nation. When the survey was run (in May 
2015) ruling parties at the regional level in Scotland and Wales were different than the ruling 
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 In Table A1 of the online appendix we use a multinomial logistic model predicting positive and negative 






















party at the central level. This represents an ideal setting to test the role of partisanship on 
responsibility attribution between levels of government devoid of any interference from 
having the same party ruling both at the central and regional level. Recent empirical evidence 
using the Spanish case shows that when the same political party runs both at the central and 
regional level the blame attribution game is played having the national government as the one 
that partisans will “exonerate” or “blame” for policy outcomes (see Authors 2018)
14,15
.  
To operationalise partisanship and national identity, respondents answered the standard 
questions about party
16
 and national identification
17
 early on in the online survey. This allows 
us to classify each group into regional government partisans (Labour identifiers in Wales and 
SNP identifiers in Scotland); central government partisans (Conservative and Liberal 
Democrats identifiers), partisans of the opposition parties both at the national and regional 
level and independent voters. The survey provides sufficient observations for the two groups 
that are of special interest for our hypotheses: the proportion of central government partisans 
                                                          
14
 For instance, using experimental evidence we show that respondents that are close to a political party that 
runs both the regional government and the national government are more likely to attribute responsibility to the 
regional government when exposed to negative information about policy outcomes. Respondents who identify 
with a party that is in opposition both at the national government and the regional government are also more 
likely to assign responsibility to the national level when exposed to negative information about policy outcomes 
(see Authors 2018). 
15
 The first-order nature of the national arena may be explained by the devolved nature of the Spanish model of 
decentralization. Great Britain has followed devolution as well, so we would expect the national level to play a 
predominant role in the attribution-game should the national and regional level be ruled by the same political 
party. 
16
 The question used takes the standard British Election Study format: “Do you generally think of yourself as a 
little closer to one of the parties than the others? If yes, which party?”, with respondents given response 
categories of Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (only shown in the Scotland 
sample), Plaid Cymru (only shown in the Wales sample), United Kingdom Independence Party, Green Party, 
British National Party, Other, none of them or don’t know. 
17
 The question used the standard format of the Linz question: “Which of the following best describes your 
identity?, with respondents given five categories: Only British/More British than [Scottish/Welsh]/As British as 






















is 25 in Scotland and 30 percent in Wales; whereas the percentage of regional government 
partisans is 39 percent in Scotland and 24 percent in Wales.  
According to the general hypotheses H1 and H2, we expect both partisans of the regional 
incumbent and those with regional identities (Scottish/ Welsh) to attribute more(less) 
responsibility towards the regional authorities- reflected in a lower average in the attribution 
scale - when they are exposed to positive (negative) treatment as compared to the control 
group. We also expect both partisans of the central incumbent and those with British 
identities to ascribe more (less) responsibility towards the national authorities (reflected in a 
higher average in the attribution scale) when they are exposed to positive (negative) 
information as compared to the control group. 
 
Empirical analysis 
Before analysing the effect of our experiment’s treatments, we first examine how individuals 
in each nation evaluate the NHS performance and which level of government they hold 
accountable for such performance. The first row of Table 1 shows the mean scores for NHS 
performance evaluations (on a 1-5 scale) among respondents of the control group. Data show 
that the evaluation of health care is negative: the scores fall below the value 3 (“stayed the 
same”), especially among the Welsh sample. Indeed, only a small portion thinks that 
healthcare got a lot or little better during last year: 19 percent in Scotland and 12 per in 
Wales. Conversely, most individuals (almost half of the Scottish respondents and almost two 
thirds of the Welsh ones) had a negative perception of the evolution of the NHS. 
Such negative bias in health care evaluations may have implications for the experiment’s 






















perceptions on the evolution of health care are overtly negative. In this context, a positive 
statement about the state of health care may not seem as credible to respondents as a negative 
statement. However, little reaction to negative stimuli is also plausible. As Druckman and 
Leeper argue, individuals with strong attitudes may be immune to the experimental treatment 




Table 1 also shows how individuals from the control group attribute responsibility of the 
NHS performance on the 1 to 7 scale. Data illustrate that although people’s perceptions may 
be potentially driven by in-group biases, individuals are not completely fools. Certainly, the 
mean scores of the control group seem to be consistent with the level of government that is 
actually responsible for the NHS in each nation, as in Scotland and Wales people generally 
view regional governments as more responsible for the NHS than in England.  
[Table 1 about here] 
In order to test our hypotheses we estimate different OLS regression models predicting 
attribution of responsibility on healthcare (on a 1–7 scale, being 1 regional authorities and 7 
central authorities
19
) in each nation. The models estimate the interactive effect between our 
experiment treatments (coded as 0 for the positive treatment and 1 for the negative treatment) 
and both partisanship and national identity. Table A2 in the appendix reports the coefficients 
and standard errors of all models.   
                                                          
18
 We cannot rule out the existence of pre-treatment effects (Gaines & Kuklinski 2011, Slothuus 2016). 
Individuals may have already received previous inputs (either positive or negative) on healthcare service 
performance before they participated in our experiment, which may indeed dilute to some extent the effect of 
our treatments. 
19






















In order to have a clearer interpretation of the results, we plot the interaction coefficients of 
Table 2 in the appendix in Figure 1. The marginal effects show how our dependent variable 
(attribution of responsibility) changes when one of our independent variables changes. Since 
our model is an OLS, the marginal effect is constant, and does not depend on any other 
variable.
20
 The top graphs in Figure 1 display the marginal effects of the interaction between 
partisanship and the experiment treatment (based in models A1 and A2 of Table A2 in the 
appendix). Results show that, in Scotland, being exposed to the negative treatment among 
regional incumbent partisans increases the responsibility scale in 1.5 points as compared to 
those who receive the positive treatment (H1a). In other words, those identified with the SNP 
are more likely to follow a blame avoidance strategy by pointing to the central government as 
the responsible authority for the poor performance of the NHS. The marginal effect of the 
treatment among regional partisans in Wales is statistically significant in the expected 
direction and exhibits a similar magnitude to the one found for Scotland (about 1.6 points). 
As far as central incumbent partisans is concerned, those who are exposed to the negative 
treatment tend to assign more responsibility to regional authorities, but the differences are not 
significantly different from zero, so we found no empirical support for H1b. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The two bottom graphs in Figure 1 exhibit the results in each nation of the interaction 
between national identity and the experiment treatment (models B1 and B2 of Table 2 in the 
appendix). Results show that individuals with strong regional identities (who feel more 
Scottish (or Welsh) than British or only Scottish (or Welsh)) tend to engage in blame-
                                                          
20
 For instance, our treatment effect among the regional incumbent partisans displayed in Figure 1 is the result 
of comparing the outcome of the regression model when changing the value of our principal coefficient 
(Treatment effect) and the interaction coefficient (Party ID: Regional incumbent x Treatment) from value one 






















avoidance when confronted with negative outcomes: they are more likely to say that the 
central government is responsible for health care when things go badly (H2a). The marginal 
effect in the case of Scotland (1.2) is again similar to that in Wales (1.1). In addition, those in 
Scotland who hold strong “national” identities (who feel more or only British) are more 
prone to attribute responsibility to the central government when they receive the negative 
treatment. This latter effect is only statistically significant at p<.10. In Wales, national 
identity does not significantly moderate the impact of the treatments. This means that, 
overall, there is very limited evidence supporting H2b. 
In Figure 2 we display the empirical findings in a different way to show variation in marginal 
effects between the positive and the negative treatment. The two graphs at the top of Figure 2 
show the differences in attribution of responsibility between regional partisans and central 
government partisans for different treatments and nations. Results show that the positive 
treatment does not significantly activate credit-taking strategies among partisans (they do not 
assign more responsibility to their preferred level of government). In other words, the impact 
of partisanship upon responsibility attribution is mainly driven by regional incumbent 
partisans exposed to the negative treatment: they hold central government more responsible 
for poor NHS outcomes than those identified with either the Conservative Party or the 
Liberal Democrats (the members of the central incumbent coalition).  
The bottom graphs in Figure 2 display similar results. Differences in responsibility attribution 
between those more or only identified with the region and those who mainly feel British are 
only significant for the negative treatment and for the Scottish sample. In Wales, attribution 
of responsibility for the results of the NHS is not significantly moderated by national identity, 






















This asymmetric effect of the negative vis-à-vis the positive treatment displayed in Figure 2 
is compatible with the existing literature on social psychology and political science. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky’s well-known prospect theory, individuals’ utility 
functions are much steeper for losses than for gains (1979:280). In the political arena it has 
been long accredited in the economic voting literature that voters tend to react more to 
economic distress rather than economic prosperity (Bloom and Price, 1975). This negativity 
bias in economic voting, or “grievance asymmetry” as some scholars calls it (Nannestad and 
Paldam 1997, Lewis Beck and Paldam, 2000), may easily apply in other policy outcomes 
rather than the economic ones. However, as we already mentioned above, this asymmetric 
effect may also be a consequence of the general negative bias in health care evaluations in the 
UK. Since general perceptions on the evolution of health care are overtly negative, 
individuals may not find the positive treatment credible and, as a result, individuals may be 
less likely to react to it.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
In Wales, national identity and partisanship are not strongly correlated. Indeed, both central 
and regional government partisans fairly evenly distributed among the different national 
identity categories. However, in the Scottish case, we do find a correlation between national 
identity and partisanship. It is not the case of central government partisans, since the 
proportion of those who feel British is similar than those who feel Scottish. However, this 
correlation is particularly high among SNP identifiers: about the 80% of them feel only or 
more Scottish. Such correlation between our two main variables in the Scottish case is 
potentially problematic since it hinders the possibility to clearly distinguish between the 






















conclusions in the Scottish scenario are nearly equivalent to those in the Welsh ones, where 
both national and party identities are not correlated. Still, we will only be able to fully 
distinguish the effect of partisanship and nationalism in Scotland by replicating the 
experiment in an eventual future scenario in which the SNP is not the incumbent party in the 
region.   
Finally, we run the regression models estimating the effect of the interactions (between the 
treatment and partisanship and between the treatment and national identity) simultaneously 
(models C1 and C2 in Table A2 in the appendix). The results of these models are summarized 
in Figure 3. Results in Scotland (top graphs in Figure 3) show that national identity 
moderates how partisans react to the treatments. Central government partisans are more likely 
to blame regional authorities for poor performance of the NHS when they feel only or more 
British, but the effect of the negative treatment is statistically insignificant among central 
partisans with stronger regional identities. The opposite occurs among respondents who feel 
close to the regional government: they tend to assign more responsibility for negative 
outcomes to the central government, but the effect is significantly different from zero only for 
those with mixed or exclusive regional identities.  
The results of the regression models in Wales point to a different conclusion. The bottom 
graphs in Figure 3 show that the effect of the treatments upon responsibility attribution 
among regional and central government partisans do not vary according to respondents’ 
national identity. For instance, Labour partisans exhibit a blame avoidance strategy (blaming 
the central government when confronted with poor NHS outcomes) that operates regardless 
of their level of attachment to the Welsh or British national identity. In summary, our results 
indicate that, contrarily to what we found in Scotland, it is partisanship, and not national 






















 [Figure 3 about here] 
Our models in Table A2 we include two measures related with political sophistication: 
educational attainment, and more importantly, political knowledge
21
. The effect of this latter 
variable on responsibility attribution behaves as expected: those with higher levels of 
political knowledge tend to correctly attribute responsibility for the health services to the 
regional level.  
England: testing the limits of cognitive biases 
In the theoretical setting introduced above we stated that devolution activates the use of 
cognitive biases in responsibility attribution through two mechanisms: an informational 
challenge (low clarity of responsibility) and an opportunity structure (the existence of “out-
group” political actors, namely different levels of government). In the English centralised 
scenario the two mechanisms that activate cognitive biases in responsibility attribution do not 
operate. On the one hand, in a centralised setting the informational challenge is low since the 
responsibility attribution is much easier than in decentralised contexts such as Scotland and 
Wales. On the other hand, the lack of relevant out-groups to blame (or give credit) for health 
policy outcomes reduces the opportunities for engaging in a blame-attribution game. 
In order to test our final hypothesis we replicate in England the survey experiment conducted 
in Scotland and Wales (see results in Table A3 in the appendix), with the only difference in 
the variable partisanship, which in England has two different categories: opposition partisans 
(those who feel identified with a party different than the Conservative Party or the Liberal 
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 The political knowledge is an index that takes value 0 means respondents do not know any of the national 
political leaders (Ed Miliband, Nick Clegg , George Osborne,  John Bercow and Theresa May) and value 5 






















Party) and central incumbent partisans (individuals who feel identified with the Conservative 
Party or the Liberal Party).  
Results are exhibited in Figure 4 and show that in England treatments have no significant 
effects upon responsibility judgements: as both treated and non-treated individuals hold 
similar perceptions about who is responsible for the NHS
22
. In other words, central 
government partisans are not more likely to blame regional authorities when they are exposed 
to negative information on the NHS nor to credit the central government when they receive 
positive information. Responsibility judgements among opposition partisans do not 
significantly vary across treatments, neither.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
The comparison of England with Scotland and Wales speaks to an issue that has been often 
overlooked by the literature, namely the limits of cognitive biases in responsibility 
attribution. Results in England indicate that, although individuals are conditioned by their 
political beliefs, they are not fools, and they will be more likely to pursue blame-avoidance 
strategies when there are credible alternative out-groups which to put the blame on. There is 
nothing intrinsically different in English people in the way they think and talk about politics 
that can account for the lack of effect of partisanship or national identity in responsibility 
judgements. Certainly, central government partisans in England may be as willing to 
exonerate or give credit to their preferred political party as partisans in Scotland or Wales. 
The only difference is that, in a centralised scenario, the former may have more limited 
opportunities to do so because blaming subnational actors is not a credible strategy. Note that 
this does not mean that in centralised settings the role of blame-attribution strategies in 
responsibility attribution is generally weaker than in devolved contexts, as partisans in 
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centralised contexts could blame other actors different than the subnational governments. 
Accordingly, from the comparison between England and the two devolved regions we can 
only conclude that cognitive mechanisms have no role in moderating responsibility 
attribution between levels of government. We will return to these caveats in the next section.  
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
In this paper we argue that the vertical fragmentation of powers in decentralized systems 
poses an informational challenge and an opportunity structure. The first one refers to low 
clarity of responsibility induced by the division of powers between levels of government. The 
second one means that devolution provides individuals with further opportunities to 
exonerate or credit their preferred incumbent party by offering a higher supply of political 
actors to which blame and credit can be attributed. We contend that individuals will react to 
these constraints by using informational shortcuts and in-group favouritism in their 
assignments of credit and blame between the central and subnational governments. Our main 
hypotheses are that individuals will resort to partisan affiliation as well as to national identity 
as their cognitive guides to make responsibility judgements between levels of government. 
Exploring the role of national identity in responsibility attribution is one of the significant 
contributions of the paper, as so far the literature on political science has overlooked the 
potential role of national identity as a source of in-group favouritism. 
We test these hypotheses with a survey experiment on responsibility attribution for health 
care outcomes in two devolved contexts: Scotland and Wales. Empirical results indicate that 
both partisanship and national identity do indeed colour individuals’ evaluations of who is 
responsible for the NHS outcomes. Individuals exposed to negative information and who feel 






















more likely to ascribe responsibility to the central government, particularly in the Scottish 
sample. More generally, empirical findings show that partisanship has a more prominent and 
encompassing effect on responsibility attribution than national identity; that group loyalties 
have a stronger moderating role in Scotland than in Wales; and that the strongest impact is 
found among individuals who are exposed to the negative treatment, not to the positive one.  
We also conduct the survey experiment in England as a robustness test and, as expected, we 
find that in England group identities do not moderate the assignment of responsibility. This 
finding suggests that, although individuals are conditioned by their political beliefs, they are 
not fools, and they will be more likely to pursue blame-avoidance strategies when there are 
credible alternative out-groups which to put the blame on. 
The study of the limits of cognitive biases represents a promising avenue for future research 
work on responsibility attribution. We stated above that in a centralised context such as 
England individuals cannot credibly blame subnational actors to exonerate their preferred 
parties. However, from the empirical analysis conducted in the paper we cannot conclude that 
the role of cognitive biases in responsibility attribution is generally lower in centralised 
settings. Individuals in England cannot blame subnational actors to exonerate their preferred 
party, but they could blame others. In a context where political authority has been diffused by 
globalisation and regional integration, supporters of the national incumbent party could 
credibly engage in a blame avoidance strategy by allocating responsibility to other relevant 
actors in the political arena such as the European Union, the IMF or the Central Bank 
(Fernández-Albertos, Kuo and Balcells 2003). This poses the question on whether the blame-
attribution game does actually operate differently in decentralised settings as compared to 
centralised contexts or if differences are simply contingent upon the available set of 






















A second line of future research in the area could explore variation in the intensity of the 
blame-attribution game across political actors, over time and across territorial units. We may 
expect some actors (i.e. European Union, IMF) to become better “targets” for blame-
avoidance strategies than others depending on contextual conditions such as the nature of the 
political debate (if dominated by national or international issues) and how it evolves over 
time. Also, the empirical analysis in the paper has revealed some interesting differences 
between Scotland and Wales in the intensity with which partisanship and national identity 
moderate responsibility judgements. Can these differences be accounted by variation across 
nations in the pace of devolution reforms (slower in Wales than in Scotland)? Or are they 
more related to contextual conditions such as the specific cleavages that define electoral 
competition? Delving into these questions could provide some theoretical insights into cross 
regional variation in patterns of responsibility attribution that could be tested in other 
asymmetric devolved countries. For instance, the analysis of cross-regional variation in 
expenditure and fiscal decentralization in Spain or Canada would allow to provide a more 
nuanced test of the theoretical mechanisms at play (for instance, testing for cross-regional 
differences in knowledge on competences due to the informational challenge). 
To conclude, by exploring the impact of cognitive mechanisms in responsibility attribution, 
any of the future research paths suggested above will help us to have a better understanding 
on the underlying mechanisms in the relationship between policy outcomes and vote choices 
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  Mean / % C.I.   Mean / % C.I.    
Evaluation of NHS 
performance (from 1 –a lot 
worse- to 5 –a lot better-) 
2.64 2.56 2.71   2.29 2.22 2.36 
   
   little worse / a lot worse 
(%) 
45.5 41.7 49.2   61.4 57.8 65 
   
  stayed the same (%) 35.2 31.6 38.8   26.4 23.1 29.6    
  little better / a lot better (%) 19.4 16.4 22.3   12.2 9.9 14.6    
Responsible for the NHS 
(from 1 -regional authorities- 
to 7-central government.) 
3.37 3.11 3.62   3.62 3.37 3.88 
   
       
Note: The dependent variable is attribution of responsibility, measured on a 1-7 scale, where 
'1' means that regional authorities have full responsibility and '7' means that UK central 

























Note: The figure shows the marginal effects of the negative treatment (contrasted with the positive 
one) on the NHS responsibility scale (1-regional authorities to 7-central authorities) conditioned by 
party identification. The spikes indicate the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates using Models 






















Figure 2. The effect of party identification (comparing regional government’s and central 
government’s partisans) and national identity (comparing British and Scottish/Welsh identity) on 
responsibility attribution for the NHS outcomes. 
 
Note: The figure shows the mean differences on the NHS responsibility scale (1-regional authorities 
to 7-central authorities) between regional and central government partisans (top line) and between 





















Figure 3. The effect of party identification and national identity on responsibility attribution for the 




Note: The figure shows the marginal effects of the negative treatment (contrasted with the positive 
treatment) on the NHS responsibility scale (1-regional authorities to 7-central authorities) conditioned 
by party identification. The spikes indicate the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates using 

























Note: The figure shows the average marginal effects of positive and negative treatments on 
the NHS responsibility scale (1-regional authorities to 7-central authorities) conditioned by 
party identification and national identity. The spikes indicate the 95% confidence intervals 
for the estimates exhibited in Table A3 of the online appendix. 
 
